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State Efforts to Close the Health Coverage Gap
Abstract
This review examines prominent state efforts to expand health coverage to the remaining uninsured. It
analyzes and compares efforts in Massachusetts, Vermont, Colorado, California, and Nevada and highlights
insights and themes that emerge. It explores the context and climate for reform within the state, stakeholder
involvement, political coalitions, financing, and possible opposition. As such, it serves as a case study in how
different states build, or fail to build, the popular and political will towards health care coverage for all
residents. This is the first in a series of reports that will monitor and analyze developments at the state level to
expand coverage and improve access to care.
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There is a health coverage gap in the United States, with nearly 
28 million individuals lacking health insurance coverage. While 
health insurance is not a guarantee of affordable health care or 
better health outcomes, recent evidence indicates that expanding 
coverage increases patients’ access to primary care, preventive care, 
chronic illness treatment, medications, and surgery. State and federal 
governments have grappled with their role in ensuring coverage, 
attempting to close the coverage gap with a mix of public and/or 
private programs. 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 was the most recent 
federal attempt to fill gaps in health coverage, and it made 
significant progress in reducing the uninsured rate. It is notable that 
as a compromise agreement, the ACA focused on incremental 
improvements rather than large-scale overhaul, particularly in the 
expansion of Medicaid and changes to the individual insurance 
market. Even if the ACA had been implemented as originally written, 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that it would 
have left 23 million nonelderly people uninsured in 2019. 
Overall, the goal of expanding coverage to the remaining uninsured 
enjoys general public support, but there is little consensus around 
policies to get us there. Further federal movement in that direction 
is unlikely in the immediate future, given the recent gridlock of the 
federal government. However, there has been activity at the state 
level toward this goal in recent years. 
This review focuses on prominent state efforts that have, or had, as 
their primary goal to close the coverage gap, and highlights insights 
and themes that emerge. Other states have targeted important and 
relevant issues such as controlling health care costs, stabilizing private 
markets, improving choice, and increasing price transparency, all of 
which may help to expand coverage, but these efforts are beyond the 
scope of this review. 
Overall, this review serves as a case study in how different states 
build, or fail to build, the popular and political will towards health care 
coverage for all residents. What might we learn across the experience 
of very different states, proposing very different solutions? We 
explore the importance of the current coverage gap within the state, 
building public will, stakeholder involvement, political coalitions, 
financing, and possible opposition.
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STATE EFFORTS TO CLOSE  
THE HEALTH COVERAGE GAP 
This review examines prominent state efforts to expand health coverage to the remaining uninsured. It analyzes 
and compares efforts in Massachusetts, Vermont, Colorado, California, and Nevada and highlights insights and 
themes that emerge. It explores the context and climate for reform within the state,  stakeholder involvement, 
political coalitions, financing, and possible opposition. As such, it serves as a case study in how different states 
build, or fail to build, the popular and political will towards health care coverage for all residents. This is the first in 
a series of reports that will monitor and analyze developments at the state level to expand coverage and improve 
access to care.
MASSACHUSETTS (2006)
Massachusetts passed a health care reform bill in 2006 that became 
a model for the national effort that resulted in the ACA. It achieved 
nearly universal coverage in the state, covering 97% of all residents as 
of 2009.
Elements of Reform. The Massachusetts reform expanded Medicaid 
coverage; created state-subsidized insurance for low-income people 
not eligible for Medicaid; merged the individual and small-group 
insurance markets; instituted an employer “fair share assessment” and 
an individual mandate; and created the Commonwealth Connector, 
an insurance marketplace that also set coverage and affordability 
standards. 
Climate for Reform. It is important to realize that Massachusetts 
was building on prior reforms to the individual marketplace, including 
guaranteed issue and community rating, and that the state had 
already broadened Medicaid eligibility under an 1115 waiver. The 
uninsured rate among the non-elderly was relatively low before 
the reform (10.9%, about 532,000 people), which dropped to 
5.5% in the year after implementation. Massachusetts had other 
characteristics conducive to successful reform: it had a relatively high 
per capita income and large rate of employer-sponsored coverage. 
Massachusetts had also created an uncompensated care pool in 1985, 
to help compensate hospitals for otherwise unpaid care. 
A motivating factor in reform was revenue shortfalls and projected 
state budget deficits that confronted the newly elected Governor 
Romney in 2003.  Medicaid provider payments were cut an average 
of 3%-5% for hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, pharmacists, and 
managed care organizations. Enrollment and eligibility cutbacks were 
in the works as well. The existing system seemed fiscally unsustainable. 
One other immediate motivation was the impending expiration of the 
Medicaid waiver, which put more than $385 million in federal funds at 
risk without further reforms. 
Political Support. The plan was introduced by a Republican 
governor, and endorsed by prominent Democrats, business leaders, 
consumer advocates, insurance executives, clergy, and hospital 
CEOs. The plan was three years in the making, beginning with a 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation-funded initiative that developed 
a comprehensive “Roadmap to Coverage.”  Developed over two 
years with multi-stakeholder involvement, the Roadmap presented 
a plan that minimized  1) disruption to the employer market;  2) the 
need for new revenues;  and 3) expansion of the government’s role.  
A central theme in the political debate was the need for “shared 
responsibility”— the idea that individuals, employers, and government 
would all need to contribute to achieving access to health care for all 
residents. A survey conducted six months after passage (but before 
implementation) found that 64% of Massachusetts residents were 
largely supportive of the new law. 
Financing. In keeping with the theme of shared responsibility, the 
plan was financed by raising the level of funding from both the public 
and private sector. The financing of the plan “worked” because the 
new burden on taxpayers was presented as primarily a redirection 
of existing funding, with minimal impact on the state budget. After 
reform, with revenues redirected as shown in Figure 1, the net new 
spending was $591 million, of which $172 million — less than 1% of the 
state budget — came from the state’s general fund. 
“Shared responsibility” was more than a slogan —a 2009 report 
found that the overall distribution of spending on health insurance 
by employers, individuals, and government remained essentially the 
same between 2005 and 2007.  Only about half of the more than 
400,000 residents who gained coverage by the end of 2008 were 
publicly subsidized. In 2009, two Massachusetts officials noted that 
“the individual mandate and employer incentives have provided good 
value for Massachusetts taxpayers, costing about $1,060 in net new 
spending per newly covered resident in 2008. The state succeeded in 
enacting a government program that stimulated private parties to use 
private dollars to help fulfill a public good.”
Governing/Decisionmaking Body. The statute established the 
quasi-public Commonwealth Connector, an insurance-purchasing 
exchange, led by the Connector Board, composed of various 
stakeholders, including consumers, business, and labor. The board 
was charged with defining affordability, negotiating premium rates 
with health plans, developing consumers’ cost-sharing provisions, and 
defining the minimum benefits package. Significantly, Massachusetts 
did not include cost-control mechanisms such as rate setting or 
restrictions on cost growth.
KEY INSIGHTS: 
•   The Massachusetts reforms were built on pre-ACA scaffolding 
that included a low proportion of uninsured residents, a highly 
regulated insurance market, and significant state spending on an 
uncompensated care pool.
•   Most of the residents that gained insurance did so through 
employers, thereby avoiding the political problems that a massive 
growth in government spending might produce. 
•   Bipartisanship—with support from a Democratic legislature and 
a Republican governor—reduced partisan divides and minimized 
entrenched opposition by party lines.
•   The reform maintained the balance of funding across sectors, 
thereby minimizing narratives about “winners” and “losers.”
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The most comprehensive state attempt to achieve universal health 
coverage in recent U.S. history occurred in Vermont. Its reform bill, 
Act 48, was enacted in 2011, with reformers wanting to improve 
upon the ACA to cover the entire population while simultaneously 
containing costs.  
Elements of Reform. Act 48 instructed the state to develop a 
single-payer, government-financed system, called Green Mountain 
Care, to provide universal coverage, replacing most health insurance 
in Vermont except for Medicare and Tricare. Employees could choose 
to keep employer-sponsored health insurance, with Green Mountain 
Care as secondary coverage, but the Act anticipated replacing 
most employer-sponsored coverage. Non-residents working for 
Vermont-based companies would also be covered. The plan offered 
a broad array of services, designed to mirror or improve upon existing 
coverage for most Vermonters. It required that hospitals and providers 
accept 105% of Medicare reimbursement rates for their privately 
insured populations, and set an overall cost growth cap of 4%.
Climate for Reform. In 2007, Vermont had enacted a package of 
health reforms, including a new program for covering the uninsured 
known as Catamount Health. This earlier reform was a product 
of political compromise, with private, subsidized coverage offered 
to low-income uninsured people. Catamount Health experienced 
higher-than-expected costs, the state had less revenue because of 
the recession, and the ACA catalyzed advocates who had pushed for 
more radical reform in the earlier efforts. Before Act 48 was enacted, 
7.6% of non-elderly residents were uninsured in 2009. After the ACA 
was implemented, the uninsured rate dropped to 6% (second lowest 
in the U.S.), about 31,200 people. 
Political Support. In 2010, Peter Shumlin, a progressive Democrat 
with a close alliance with Senator Bernie Sanders, ran on a single-
payer platform and won election as Governor.  State legislators also 
wanted to go beyond the ACA, and push for radical reform. The plan 
was bolstered by a strong “Healthcare Is a Human Right” campaign, 
and the involvement of well-known health economists William Hsiao 
and Jonathan Gruber. Hsiao had experience developing universal 
health coverage programs in other countries.  
FIGURE 1  
The Financing of Massachusetts Health Care Reform*
Source Financing before Reform Financing after Reform
Additional Financing, 
Fiscal Years 2006-2009
Fiscal Year 2006, Actual Fiscal Year 2007, Actual Fiscal Year 2008, Actual Fiscal Year 2009, Estimated
millions of dollars
Spending
MassHealth 770 511 642 795
Commonwealth Care 0 133 628 805
UCP-HSTNF 656 665 416 417
Total 1,426 1,309 1,686 2,017
Additional, 2006-2009 591
Revenues
UCP-HSNTF provider 
assessments and insurer surcharges
320 320 320 320
Local contribution to MCO 
supplemental payments
385 0 0 0
Federal financial participation 688 816 888 1,272
Dedicated revenues 0 7 21 219
Total 1,393 1,143 1,229 1,811
Additional, 2006-2009 418
Difference
General fund share 33 166 457 205
General fund share of net new 
annual spending, 2006-2009
172
*  Data are from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services. No enrollment increases besides those directly attributable to eligibility changes have been included in this analysis. 
Commonwealth Care spending is net of enrollee contributions. Dedicated revenues include new taxes and penalties dedicated to paying for health care reform. Some differences appear not to be exact, 
because of rounding. MCO denotes managed-care organization, and UCP-HSNTF uncompensated care pool—Health Safety Net Trust Fund (as the pool is called under health care reform).
SOURCE: Massachusetts Health Care Reform — Near-Universal Coverage at What Cost? NEJM  2009; 361:2012-2015
4However, in 2014, Gov. Shumlin won re-election by a single 
percentage point margin, which left him without a strong mandate 
to implement the single-payer promise he had run on.  In addition, 
the political will to enact the plan waned in the absence of a clear 
financing mechanism.
Political Opposition. “Partners for Health Care Reform,” a coalition 
of the Vermont Medical Society, Fletcher Allen Health Care, Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, Vermont Association of Hospitals and Health 
Systems, Vermont Business Roundtable. Vermont Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies, 
did not come out explicitly against the plan, but challenged some 
of the assumptions regarding provider payments and administrative 
savings. The group commissioned a report that estimated the plan 
would amount to a 16% cut in payments to doctors and hospitals 
(something the state disputed). Public opinion polling in 2011 found 
that residents were divided in their support for the law, with 40% 
supporting it, 35% opposing it, and 25% unsure. In 2014, polls showed 
that the public remained divided, with 40% supporting the plan, 39% 
opposing it, and 21% undecided. 
Financing. The initial Act provided no financial details, but 
directed that a financing plan be produced by 2013. Initial estimates 
predicted immediate and longer term savings for the health system 
(see Figure 2), and concluded that a new payroll tax of 9.4% for 
employers and new income taxes of 3.1% for individuals would replace 
health insurance premiums.  However, other estimates were not so 
optimistic, and Gov. Shumlin did not produce the report of how 
much the act would cost until long after it was introduced, which may 
have contributed to its failure. Projections kept changing because 
anticipated federal revenues from Medicaid and the ACA declined 
in the interim, and because the new plan offered ‘platinum’ level 
insurance (94% actuarial value) rather than the 87% actuarial value of 
the initial estimate. Yet policymakers refused to reduce the offering 
to gold-tiered benefits because that would have been a downgrade 
in coverage for many Vermont citizens. The plan was also expensive 
because it tried to replace federally-subsidized insurance with state-
subsidized insurance.  In the final, official analysis, the plan would 
require raising payroll taxes by 11.5% and income tax by up to 9%, with 
lower predicted savings to the health system of 1.6%.
Governing/Decisionmaking Body. Act 48 created the Green 
Mountain Care Board with unprecedented, centralized responsibility 
for benefits design, coverage, and premiums.  It was tasked with 
controlling the rate of growth in health care costs and “improving the 
health of Vermonters” through a variety of regulatory and planning 
tools.  These tools included all-payer rate setting and an explicit cost 
growth cap (4%). The Board consisted of five Vermonters, nominated 
by a broad-based committee and appointed by the Governor. 
Outcome. Citing the risk of “economic shock,” Gov. Shumlin pulled 
the plan in December 2014, stating that it was not the time to move 
forward with a publicly-financed health care system in Vermont. “Our 
current way of paying for health care is inequitable. I wanted to fix 
this at the state level, and I thought we could. I have learned that 
the limitations of state-based financing – limitations of federal law, 
limitations of our tax capacity, and sensitivity of our economy – make 
that unwise and untenable at this time.”  
KEY INSIGHTS: 
•   The public was divided in its support for radical health reform 
when it passed.  Three years later, it was just as divided, in the 
absence of any sustained effort to educate the public about what 
the act did and how it would affect people’s lives. Thus, there was 
no groundswell of support when estimates were much higher 
than anticipated. Health reform needs significant time and energy 
devoted to educating the public about the plan and its financing.
•   The state government did not produce a competing narrative to 
the complaint about big-government expansion.
•   States must work with hospitals and providers at the table for buy-in 
and to develop all-payer rates and limits on cost growth. Vermont’s 
inability to bring these players together in support of the bill likely 
contributed to its failure.
•   It is important to think about the behavioral economics of how a 
plan will be received. For example, workers might fail to notice their 
employer-based health insurance premiums, but would notice an 
increase in their tax bill. 
FIGURE 2   
Financial Estimates from Three Projections for a  
Vermont Single-Payer Health Plan*
Variable 2011, Harvard 2013, UMass 2014, State of Vermont
Estimated savings (%) 8-12% short term;
24-25% long term
1.5% over 3 yr 1.6% over 5 yr
Estimated new taxes
    Employers 9.4% of payroll Not estimated 11.5% of payroll
    Employees 3.1% of household 
income
Not estimated Sliding scale up to 
9.5% of household 
income
Cost gap to be state 
financed
NA $1.6 million $2.5 billion
New federal revenues 
from ACA Section 1332
$420 million $267 million $106 million
Total cost of Green 
Mountain Care
NA $3.5 billion $4.3 million
* ACA denotes Affordable Care Act, NA not applicable, and UMass University of Massachusetts
SOURCE: The Demise of Vermont’s Single-Payer Plan. NEJM 2015; 372:1584-1585
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Through a ballot initiative in 2016, Colorado was the next state to try 
to pass an ambitious, universal health coverage plan (ColoradoCare). 
The plan would have replaced most employer-sponsored insurance 
coverage, individual market plans, Medicaid, and CHIP with a single-
payer system.
Elements of Reform. ColoradoCare was a taxpayer-financed 
system of universal health coverage for all Colorado residents. It 
would be created by the state constitution (through Amendment 
69), but largely beyond the control of the governor and legislature. 
It would replace Medicaid (but not Medicare) and private insurance. 
It featured broad coverage, no restrictions on provider networks, no 
deductibles, and some copayments. 
It would have also replaced the medical care portion of workers’ 
compensation insurance. Beneficiaries that would have been eligible 
for Medicaid or the Children’s Basic Health Plan would have received 
benefits required by federal law, in addition to ColoradoCare’s 
standard benefits. The wording of Amendment 69, as presented to 
the voters on the ballot, is below:
SHALL STATE TAXES BE INCREASED $25 BILLION ANNUALLY IN 
THE FIRST FULL FISCAL YEAR, AND BY SUCH AMOUNTS THAT ARE 
RAISED THEREAFTER, BY AN AMENDMENT TO THE COLORADO 
CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHING A HEALTHCARE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
TO FUND HEALTHCARE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS WHOSE PRIMARY 
RESIDENCE IS IN COLORADO, AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, 
CREATING A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY CALLED COLORADOCARE 
TO ADMINISTER THE HEALTHCARE PAYMENT SYSTEM; PROVIDING 
FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF COLORADOCARE BY AN INTERIM 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES UNTIL AN ELECTED BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
TAKES RESPONSIBILITY; EXEMPTING COLORADOCARE FROM THE 
TAXPAYER’S BILL OF RIGHTS; ASSESSING AN INITIAL TAX ON THE TOTAL 
PAYROLL FROM EMPLOYERS, PAYROLL INCOME FROM EMPLOYEES, 
AND NONPAYROLL INCOME AT VARYING RATES; INCREASING THESE 
TAX RATES WHEN COLORADOCARE BEGINS MAKING HEALTHCARE 
PAYMENTS FOR BENEFICIARIES; CAPPING THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
INCOME SUBJECT TO TAXATION; AUTHORIZING THE BOARD TO 
INCREASE THE TAXES IN SPECIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES UPON APPROVAL 
OF THE MEMBERS OF COLORADOCARE; REQUIRING COLORADOCARE 
TO CONTRACT WITH HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO PAY FOR 
SPECIFIC HEALTHCARE BENEFITS; TRANSFERRING ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE MEDICAID AND CHILDREN’S BASIC HEALTH PROGRAMS 
AND ALL OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL HEALTHCARE FUNDS FOR 
COLORADO TO COLORADOCARE; TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY 
TO COLORADOCARE FOR MEDICAL CARE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE 
BE PAID FOR BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE; REQUIRING 
COLORADOCARE TO APPLY FOR A WAIVER FROM THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT TO ESTABLISH A COLORADO HEALTHCARE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM; AND SUSPENDING THE OPERATIONS OF THE COLORADO 
HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE AND TRANSFERRING ITS RESOURCES TO 
COLORADOCARE?
Climate for Reform. In 2013, 14% of Colorado’s non-elderly residents, 
approximately 646,200 people, were uninsured. After implementation 
of the ACA, the uninsured rate decreased to 10% (469,600 people), 
but parts of Colorado (rural areas with few providers and little insurer 
competition) faced skyrocketing premiums and growing cost-sharing.
Political Support. The initiative was shepherded by physician and 
Colorado State Sen. Irene Aguilar, a Democrat, and had the support 
of slightly more than half of the Democratic-controlled legislature. 
It garnered the necessary 100,000 signatures to put it on the ballot 
by tapping into public frustrations over rising out-of-pocket costs 
and limited coverage. It was supported by ColoradoCareYES, a 
community-based organization.
Political Opposition. The Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce 
coordinated opposition through a campaign group called Coloradans 
for Coloradans. State Treasurer Walker Stapleton, a Republican, 
and former Governor Bill Ritter, a Democrat, co-chaired the group. 
Gov. John Hickenlooper, a Democrat, also opposed the proposal, 
stating, “Our reforms are just beginning to bear fruit…and it would be 
premature to dramatically remake our health care system at this time.” 
Strong bipartisan political opposition included four U.S. representatives, 
more than a dozen state senators, and more than a dozen state 
representatives. Sen. Bennet and three former governors spoke out 
against it, while candidates up for re-election found it risky to support 
the plan. Additionally, influential industries including realtors, bankers, 
farmers, contractors, and especially health insurance companies 
opposed it. 
The measure lost the support of important women’s health groups 
due to a fear that because the Colorado state constitution bans the 
use of ‘public funds’ for abortion, women covered by ColoradoCare 
would not be covered for abortions. By August 2016, the liberal group 
ProgressNow Colorado announced its opposition to the measure.
Financing. Unlike Vermont, Colorado did propose a financing plan: 
a payroll tax of 10% (pre-tax payroll premiums of 3.33% for employees 
and 6.67% for employers), and 10% of all non-payroll income, such as 
self-employment and capital gains. The tax would apply to individual 
income below $350,000 for a single person, or $450,000 for married 
couples filing jointly. Business owners said the extra taxes would have 
been burdensome and unpopular, driving business from the state. 
When fully implemented, the plan would cost $36 billion, more than 
the state’s present budget. An independent, nonpartisan analysis 
concluded that the proposed revenue to pay for ColoradoCare would 
not keep up with increasing health care costs, resulting in growing 
deficits each year.
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. The Amendment proposed 
an interim board of 15 members appointed by the Governor and 
legislative leaders, followed by a permanent 21-person board of 
trustees elected from seven districts across the state. That board would 
set benefits and budgets.  There was a great deal of fear that the board 
would have too much control over health care, and voters would not 
have been able to recall the elected board members. Detractors also 
said that health care providers could be inadequately reimbursed under 
the new system, causing them to stop providing care in Colorado and, 
thus, decreasing Coloradans’ health care choices.
Outcome. When Colorado put single payer on the ballot as 
Amendment 69 in 2016, it failed badly, with 79% voting against 
it. Opponents (Coloradans for Coloradans) outspent supporters 
6(ColoradoCareYES) by more than five to one, with messages 
focused on the increased tax burden on employees and employers, 
and claiming that inadequate reimbursement would lead to a 
decrease in health choices. 
KEY INSIGHTS: 
•   A ballot initiative, because the language is set early, does not lend 
itself well to the process of building support over time for large-
scale reforms. 
•   It is clear that tax shock is a severe obstacle to such efforts. Support 
for single-payer dramatically drops if a tax hike is imposed. “Shall 
state taxes be increased $25 billion annually…” is not likely to be 
positively received without a major initiative to educate the public 
about savings in the long-term. 
•   Fear of diminished or constrained choices in providers or coverage 
proved to be a powerful drawback. There was little appetite for 
delegating choices to a board, even an elected one; the public’s 
distrust of such governing bodies runs deep.
•   Fractured coalitions with the loss of women’s health groups proved 
problematic.
•   Without unified support from either party’s officials, building 
political will for large-scale reform is unlikely.
CALIFORNIA (2017)
The next state to attempt universal health coverage was California.  In 
June 2017, the California State Senate passed a bill to create “Healthy 
California”—a program to create a single health care market in the state. 
Elements of Reform. The bill would create the “Healthy California 
Trust Fund” in the State Treasury. Federal and state funds previously 
allocated to Medicaid, CHIP, Medicare, ACA subsidies, and others 
would be deposited in the trust fund. Under the Healthy California 
plan, individuals would not be subject to premiums, copayments, or 
deductibles. Medical, pharmaceutical, dental, vision, and long-term 
care would be provided to all residents—including undocumented 
immigrants—free of charge. Providers would be paid Medicare rates. 
Climate for Reform. In 2013, 16% of California’s non-elderly 
residents, approximately 5.47 million people, were uninsured. After 
implementation of the ACA (and Medicaid expansion), the uninsured 
rate dropped to 10% (2.95 million people) in 2016. One in three of 
California’s remaining uninsured are non-citizens who are not eligible 
for any public program of coverage. California has a long history 
of campaigns and political leaders who have espoused universal 
coverage.
Financing. The bill required the legislature to develop a revenue 
plan for Healthy California.  Experts estimate the program would 
cost about $400 billion per year—double California’s current budget. 
California could cover about $200 billion from current federal and 
state spending—including Medicaid and Medicare. An additional 
$100 to $150 billion could be captured from what employers are 
already spending. The additional funding needed could involve a 15% 
payroll tax, a 2.3% sales tax, and/or a business tax increase. 
Political Support. The powerful California Nurses Association led 
the campaign for the bill, with other support from labor unions and 
consumer groups. Public support in California for single payer is 65%, 
yet drops to 42% if such a plan requires an increase in taxes. Lt. Gov. 
Gavin Newsom supports single payer and is running for governor in 
2018.
Political Opposition. A wide array of business groups opposed the 
measure, including health insurers, manufacturers and the California 
Chamber of Commerce, which called the bill a “job killer” because of 
the tax burden it would impose on responsible employers. Opponents 
also pointed to the lack of cost containment measures that would lead 
to budget shortfalls, requiring drastic cuts in services or long waits for 
providers.
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. An independent public entity 
called the Healthy California Board would govern the program. The 
nine-member board would have representatives from the health 
care sector, labor, and the general public, and include individuals with 
health care experience. The Governor, Senate Committee on Rules, 
and Speaker of the Assembly would appoint the board members, 
and each member would serve four-year terms. The board would 
be responsible for negotiating contracts and payment methods 
with health care providers and health care systems, and for seeking 
necessary waivers and approvals to allow existing federal health-
related payments to be made directly to the program. 
Outcome. California Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon shelved 
the plan in June 2017, citing a lack of a funding mechanism that 
would allow it to deliver the care and coverage that it promised. The 
measure is likely to be reconsidered in the 2018 legislative session. 
KEY INSIGHTS: 
•   The California plan is about as ambitious, and disruptive, as has 
been introduced. 
•   The plan faced significant hurdles both politically and practically. It 
would require a variety of federal waivers of existing Medicaid and 
Medicare regulations, and the financing mechanism would need to 
be developed.
•   The lack of a defined financing mechanism for California’s proposal 
left even its supporters unable to proceed.
•   Because the plan would create a true single-payer market (replacing 
all present insurance, both public and private) it faced predictable  
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7and well-funded opposition from those whose livelihoods were at 
stake (such as health insurers).
•   California is one of the success stories in terms of implementing the 
ACA and creating a robust individual market. The fact that many 
of its remaining uninsured cannot obtain coverage through ACA-
related provisions (due to citizenship status) provides incentive to 
pursue disruptive change.
NEVADA (2017)
In 2017, the Nevada legislature passed a plan to take the state closer 
to universal health coverage by building on the existing multi-payer 
model. It leverages the structure and negotiated rates of Medicaid 
to create a “public option” plan on the state exchange. It should be 
noted that although the plan would be available to all, it would not be 
subsidized—making it a vehicle for incremental progress, while unlikely 
to achieve universal coverage on its own.
Elements of Reform. The Medicaid-buy in model —known as 
“Sprinkle Care” after its namesake and champion, State Rep. Mike 
Sprinkle, a Democrat – would have been the first state program to 
allow individuals of all incomes to buy into Medicaid, at full cost; low-
income people who qualify for tax credits under the ACA would have 
the option to use those credits to buy Medicaid-style coverage on the 
state’s Health Insurance Exchange. Employer-sponsored insurance 
and Medicare would have been maintained, but a commercial 
insurance product resembling the state’s Medicaid coverage would 
have provided consumers a new option and leveraged the state’s 
lower Medicaid reimbursement rates. The bill was only four pages 
long, and provided limited information on costs, premiums, and cost-
sharing. 
Climate for Reform. Prior to the implementation of the ACA, 22% 
of Nevada’s non-elderly population (522,200 people) were uninsured 
in 2013, one of the highest rates in the nation. A number of factors 
accounted for the high rate of uninsured, including Nevada’s high rate 
of service sector jobs and low-wage jobs without health benefits, as 
well as a high level of unemployment. 
Under the ACA, that percentage was cut in half, primarily because 
of Nevada’s Medicaid expansion, in which enrollment grew by 90%. 
Nevada’s Gov. Brian Sandoval was the first Republican Governor 
to choose to expand Medicaid after the Supreme Court made it 
optional. According to Rep. Sprinkle, the idea for the bill sprung from 
two dynamics: first, the new Administration’s support for a greater 
state role in health reform decisions, and second, ambiguity and 
uncertainty around whether the ACA would continue to exist. A 
primary motive to move the bill was to give the Medicaid expansion 
population an option to buy-in if the ACA were repealed and the 
state lost the significant federal subsidy that enabled it to expand 
Medicaid in the first place. 
Political Support. In 2017, Democrats controlled both chambers of 
the Nevada Legislature, which meets every other year. During floor 
votes on the House and Senate floors, there was no debate even as 
the bill passed along largely party lines. Nearly one in four Nevada 
residents is insured by Medicaid, which enjoys broad popular support. 
Political Opposition. The Nevada Hospital Association, along with 
other health care providers, voiced concerns about the new plan 
reimbursing them at lower rates. However, they remained neutral, 
given the lack of detail about whether the plan might displace private 
payers or primarily be an option for people who were uninsured or at 
risk of losing their existing Medicaid coverage.
Financing. No details. According to Rep. Sprinkle, the state insurance 
commissioner was prepared to obtain an actuarial estimate of the 
premiums and costs once the bill was signed. The goal, he said, was to 
offer a premium that “is affordable, but that is also not going to cause 
such marketplace disruption that we lose a private insurance industry 
that we obviously need in the state.” Because the bill included no state 
subsidies for the plan, its effect on taxpayers would be minimal, with 
administrative costs built into the premium calculation. 
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. The Nevada Medicaid 
Department would manage the new program, which would be 
separate from the Medicaid program. The department would have 
the option to contract with managed care organizations (MCOs), as it 
does with four MCOs in the Medicaid program in the more populous 
areas of Nevada. 
Outcome. In June 2017, Gov. Sandoval, a Republican, vetoed the 
plan, writing that the legislation was “an undeveloped remedy to an 
undefined problem.” He also expressed concern that many people 
buying into the plan would be those with private insurance, rather 
than the uninsured. Proponents vowed to bring the plan back for 
consideration in the next legislative session in 2019. 
KEY INSIGHTS: 
•   A Medicaid buy-in approach made sense in a state that saw its 
uninsured rate decline significantly through Medicaid expansion.
•   The bill passed quickly in reaction to the threat of ACA repeal and 
particularly threats to federal Medicaid funding. 
•   The plan had a short timeline for start-up, with a target date of 
January 2019, with few details on how the plan would actually work. 
This likely contributed to its failure. 
•   The plan sought to build upon Nevada’s existing framework, which 
includes four managed care companies with Medicaid contracts. In 
so doing, it attempted to avoid severe pushback from the insurance 
industry.
8GETTING TO THE FINISH LINE 
States that have pursued universal health coverage often have 
relatively low percentages of uninsured residents, meaning that the 
gaps in coverage they have to fill may be small. But paradoxically, it 
may be harder to build the support to pass a broad proposal when 
the coverage problem is limited. In the face of small coverage gaps, 
disruptive reforms may encounter majorities of the public fearful of 
changes to their existing coverage and thus more skeptical of change.
BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT 
Educating the public about present health care costs and existing 
financing mechanisms is key. An understanding of this dynamic is 
essential to understanding the “problem” and countering the message 
of higher taxes. Financing through taxes leaves taxpayers (and the 
proposals) vulnerable to health care costs that grow at greater rates 
than revenue sources.
FINANCING 
These proposals had varying levels of information as to the financing 
for the reforms. Some efforts floundered by either not offering 
information about how their policy would be fiscally sustainable, 
or by proposing drastic tax increases that faced backlash from the 
public and business community. Massachusetts found success by 
demonstrating the program could be paid for by reallocating existing 
funding sources and would require minimal new state funds, in the 
“shared responsibility” model.
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT 
Building a broad stakeholder coalition in support of coverage 
expansion proposals is an important element of success in swaying 
public opinion and political support. Influential stakeholders who 
feel left out, or who feel their interests may be threatened, are likely 
to galvanize opposition to efforts to expand coverage. In particular, 
hospitals and other providers should be brought in early to address 
concerns about the long-term adequacy of payments.
BUILDING POLITICAL COALITIONS 
Although universal health care is often considered a Democratic 
issue, the example of Massachusetts shows that it can be a Republican 
one as well. Conversely, the example of Colorado shows that health 
reform can cause intraparty division and bipartisan opposition, 
especially if it conflicts with other party priorities. 
COUNTERING THE OPPOSITION 
Single-payer proposals create the impression of larger government 
at the expense of the private sector, while an all-payer model raises 
the specter of price setting and price caps. In either case, getting the 
language right is essential, to avoid concepts that prompt immediate 
opposition. The example of Massachusetts shows that messaging 
such as “shared responsibility” can be used to counter these objections 
effectively.
DETAILS 
One unanswered question is whether including details in an initial 
proposal is a help or hindrance to initial buy-in. It may be the case 
that when building upon existing frameworks, detailed plans are not 
needed for buy-in; but when planning for disruptive change, detailed 
financing and payment plans are essential in fully educating the public, 
or opponents may fill the void with scare tactics.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Implementing universal coverage in a state, by almost any mechanism, 
must involve buy-in from the federal government in terms of waiver 
approvals. It is important for proponents to understand what the 
parameters of that approval might be, and to frame state debates 
within the context of the federal government’s likely reaction.
EMERGING QUESTIONS AND THEMES
This review summarizes prominent recent attempts at the state level to adopt health reforms that could improve health care access through 
expanding coverage to all residents. As such, each state operates as a case study in building, or failing to build, the popular and political will 
towards reform.  What might we learn across the experience of very different states, proposing very different solutions?
9FUTURE STATE EFFORTS
Expanding health coverage to all people is a popular idea, but not a monolithic one.  In 
the coming years, many states will consider a variety of approaches specific to their needs, 
population, economic characteristics, and political will for reform. Some state leaders are 
pursuing a single-payer model, and others are looking to find market-based solutions with a 
mix of public and private payers. 
Our future analyses will examine and track developments at the state level to catalogue and 
share lessons learned, and inform state lawmakers as they consider alternatives. As they do, 
we will update this review and build on the foundation of both the successes and the failures. 
This review was prepared by Janet Weiner, Rebecka Rosenquist, and Erin Hartman at Penn 
LDI. It was produced as part of a research partnership between United States of Care and 
Penn LDI, and we thank reviewers from both organizations for their valuable input.
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